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BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A REGULATORY
PROPOSAL
BY MARCIA A. VALIANTE* AND PAUL R. MULDOON**
The human race now holds the ability to alter the hereditary characteristics of
all life forms through the use of biotechnology. Although the benefits seem lim-
itless, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the risks this technology poses
to human health and the environment. In Canada, the biotechnology industry is
largely unregulated. The authors explore the potential and associated risks, and
propose some suggestions for its regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
[W]e have had an Industrial Revolution, an Age of Steam, the Automotive Age,
and so on, up to the Atomic Age. We are now at the crossroads of a new age: the
Age of Biology.1
Because of dramatic advances in microbiology over the last thirty
years, the genetic blueprint of all living things is now subject to mani-
pulation by man. The human race holds the ability to alter the heredi-
tary characteristics of all life forms and, thus, to redefine the meaning
of life itself. The revolutionary techniques developed to manipulate the
genetic make-up of living organisms are biotechnology, the marriage of
biology and technology.
The foreseeable benefits of biotechnology are seemingly limitless:
to ease hunger in agriculturally marginal areas of the world through
the development of drought-, pest- or cold-resistant plants; to transform
waste into energy; to clean up oil and other toxic chemical spills; and to
manufacture large amounts of vaccines and pharmaceuticals to allevi-
ate human suffering. Many of these applications of biotechnology will
involve the use of genetically altered organisms for the purpose of mo-
difying the environment or the relationships among organisms within it.
The use of biotechnology, however, raises ethical questions con-
* Copyright, 1985, Marcia A. Valiante and Paul R. Muldoon.
* B.A., B.Sc., LL.B. Director of Research, Canadian Environmental Law Research
Foundation.
** B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M., Research Associate, Canadian Environmental Law Research
Foundation.
I R.H. Guthrie, "DNA Technology: Are We Ready?" (1981) 6 Dalhousie L.J. 659 at 659.
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cerning the desirability of allowing humans to by-pass the natural pro-
cess of evolution and, more particularly, to breed genetically superior
organisms and weed out those deemed genetically inferior. These ques-
tions and others surely need to be debated before mankind embarks
upon this New Age of Biology.2 Moreover, there is a great deal of un-
certainty about the risks this technology poses to human health and the
environment. Because living organisms are involved, the risk has been
described as being of "low probability" but of "high consequence." The
track record of society's management of risks to human and environ-
mental health, as evidenced in the handling of toxic chemicals and nu-
clear radiation, should convince societal decision-makers of the need for
caution when standing on the threshold of a new technology.
In Canada, research in various areas of biotechnology has been
underway for several years and is now at the stage where products for
commercial and industrial use are being developed. The furthest ad-
vanced and most well-known of these are the medical products, such as
insulin derived from human cells and interferon used in the treatment
of cancer. Examples in other areas of application include the develop-
ment of biological pesticides for agricultural and forest use; new agri-
cultural plant strains that are disease- or cold-resistant; and microorga-
nisms able to leach minerals or accelerate oil recovery.
Despite these notable advances, the biotechnology industry in Can-
ada is essentially unregulated and only guidelines for the conduct of
research exist. It is imprudent to rush ahead with a technology
designed to alter the environment without considering the impact on
the long-term stability of the environment and public health and with-
out being able to prevent or to mitigate its use where those impacts are
found to be destructive. Given the potential benefits and risks, and the
existing regulatory vacuum, it is essential that all sectors in Canada -
government, industry, environmentalists and others - begin to actively
debate the most appropriate means of regulating biotechnology.
This article will explore the potential and associated risks of bio-
technology and then propose some suggestions for its regulation. These
proposals start from a "middle" position and do not address the ethical
question of whether the genetic make-up of other species should be
manipulated for the benefit of humans. Rather, it assumes that indus-
trial applications of biotechnology will occur and that they will at some
time be subject to regulation. The proposals are intended to be a cata-
lyst for more discussion on the appropriate forms of regulation to mini-
2 See, e.g., J. Rifkin, Algeny (1984) and references cited therein; S. Krimsky, Genetic Al-
chemy: The Social History of the Recombinant DNA Controversy (1982).
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mize the environmental hazards of biotechnology and to ensure that
regulation precedes its widespread application. Within the broad scope
of this topic, the release of genetically-altered organisms into the natu-
ral environment forms the focus of discussion.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE INDUSTRY AND THE NEED
FOR REGULATION
A. What is Biotechnology?
Although the term "biotechnology" is often used, it has no gener-
ally-agreed definition except for those which tend to be so all-encom-
passing as to contribute little to the understanding of the term. For
example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) defines biotechnology as the ". . . application of scien-
tific and engineering principles to the processing of materials by biolog-
ical agents to produce goods and services." 3 Another definition, based
upon the OECD definition, is that used by the National Research
Council of Canada:
The application of science and engineering to the direct or indirect use of cells
from plants or animals, or micro-organisms, in their natural or modified forms,
for the production of goods or the provision of services.
4
These definitions include a broad range of activities many of which are
hardly new or revolutionary, such as fermentation, and do not deserve
public concern.
The aspects of biotechnology of most interest and concern grew
out of the dramatic breakthroughs in microbiology which allow scien-
tists to split genetic molecules and combine them with the genes from
other organisms. Uses of these techniques range from the cloning of
large numbers of bacteria or viruses to the insertion of a desirable char-
acteristic from an organism into a higher plant or animal.5 The first
step in the new age of biology came in 1944 when O.T. Avery and his
colleagues discovered that genes, the hereditary information code for
3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Chemical Control Division, Office of Toxic Sub-
stances, "Regulation of Genetically Engineered Substances under TSCA" in U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, Committee on Science and Technology, The Environmental Implications of Genetic
Engineering (February 1984) 1 at 112 [hereinafter House Committee Report].
4 A. Albagli, "The Current State of Biotechnology in Canada" in Canadian Environmental
Law Research Foundation, The Regulation of Biotechnology (1984) 1 at 3 [hereinafter CELRF
Proceedings].
5 For further discussion, see, e.g., U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Impacts
of Applied Genetics: Microorganisms, Plants and Animals (1981) [hereinafter OTA Report];
R.F. Weaver, "Beyond Supermouse: Changing Life's Genetic Blueprint" (December 1984) 166
National Geographic 818.
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all living things, were made of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). By 1953,
the structure of the DNA molecule had been discovered. Drawing on
the next two decades of research, Paul Berg and other scientists at
Stanford University in 1972 spliced together the DNA from two sepa-
rate viruses to create recombinant DNA, a new life form. Within a
year, scientists had inserted recombinant DNA into host bacteria that
reproduced, or cloned, the foreign DNA,6 and the age of genetic engi-
neering had begun. As one authority noted, "[T]he principal signifi-
cance of the new technology was that it made possible the transfer of
genes between species with considerable specificity and ease. It, there-
fore, removed the species barriers of conventional genetics."7 In other
words, the natural barriers to interbreeding - between species and be-
tween plants and animals - have been removed.
The sophisticated genetic engineering techniques of recombinant
DNA and cell fusion allow the extraction of genetic material from one
species with certain desirable characteristics and its transference to an-
other species. The result is a new life form or "genotype" able to pass
on its new characteristics to its offspring, and it is spurring the rapid
development of biotechnology industries which can use the techniques
to develop commercial products, such as insulin from human cells,
more easily and efficiently. Biotechnology is thus seen as one of the
industries of the future. By 1983, there were some 111 Japanese firms
in the biotechnology field" and, in the U.S., 208 specialty firms and 84
major corporations with active market interests in biotechnology., As
the dawning of the new age of biology began to shed its first light, a
strong momentum was building throughout the industrialized world to
join in the industrial applications of this new technology. 10
B. Industrial Applications of Biotechnology - The Benefits
The application of biotechnology in everyday life is now just
around the corner. The areas where it is first expected include:"
a See, e.g., Weaver, ibid. at 832; R.G. Adler, "Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering -
The Promise for Pollution Control" (September 1982) 1 The Environmental Forum 6 at 8.
S. Krimsky, Regulatory Policies on Biotechnology in Canada (October 1984) at 19.
8 See, Environmental Information Center, The Telegen Directory of Japanese Biotechnology(1983).
Ibid.
10 W.A. Cochrane, "Biotechnology: New Industrial Opportunities for Canada" in Biotech-
nology in Canada (1980) 11 at 14-17.
1 M.S. Levin et al., Applied Genetic Engineering: Future Trends and Problems (1983);
OTA Report, supra note 5; Demain & Solomon, "Industrial Microbiology" (September 1981)
Sci. Am. 66.
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Health - Much effort is going into this sector to develop diagnostic
products, pharmaceuticals and vaccines. At present, biotechnological
techniques can manufacture such products as insulin derived from
human cells, interferon and human growth hormone. In the future,
new products of biotechnology hold the potential to kill cancer cells
without harming normal cells and thereby supplement conventional
chemotherapy, or to prevent cancer from developing at all. Approxi-
mately 60 - 70% of biotechnology research and development funds
world-wide go toward the health-related area. 12
Agriculture - Advances made possible in the agricultural sector by
biotechnology are significant and perhaps the most far-reaching. Re-
search in the area is directed toward a variety of activities.1 3 Micro-
organisms have been developed that can be sprayed on temperature-
sensitive plants and food crops to help protect them from frost dam-
age. This allows growing seasons to be lengthened and for the agri-
cultural use of northern regions. Biotechnological pesticides may pro-
vide a more effective and less toxic .means of insect and rodent
control than conventional chemical pesticides. In addition, new plant
strains able to resist disease and drought are being developed, al-
lowing farming in marginal areas, perhaps alleviating part of the
world's famine problems. Other plant strains would produce bacteria
that are able to use nitrogen from the air as a nutrient, resulting in
far less dependence on chemical fertilizers.
Mining and Petrochemicals - Research is being conducted into the
use of microbes to leach minerals such as copper, nickel, gold and
uranium from ore bodies and tailings.1 4 In addition, the petro-chemi-
cal industry may benefit from biotechnology by the use, for instance,
of various microorganisms which can synthesize chemicals that can
significantly increase oil recovery rates.
In addition to these industrial applications, biotechnology holds the
potential for hundreds of other beneficial uses, as in the areas of pollu-
tion control and energy. Developments include: the creation of microor-
ganisms capable of rendering organic pollutants such as
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) less toxic, for cleaning up oil and
other chemical spills, and for treatment of wastes;' 5 the development of
12 Albagli, supra note 4 at 8.
"3 Canadian Agricultural Research Council, Biotechnology: Research and Development for
Canada's Agriculture and Food System (1983); Levin et al., supra note 11 at 51.
1 Levin et al., ibid. at 88-92; "Microbes Used for Metal Recovery Genetically Engineered"
(1983) 3 Newswatch 8; "Microorganisms Mine Copper Without Making Acid; Metals Snared
Selectively from Waste Solution" (1983) 3 Newswatch 8.
15 Adler, supra note 6 at 6-8; Levin et al., ibid. at 92-104.
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microorganisms to accelerate the degrading processes of inoculated
sludges in waste treatment facilities; and the production of liquid fuels
and of enzyme-based substances that can literally "eat away" obstruc-
tions in a clogged drain.16
In light of the potential uses and benefits of biotechnology, it is not
surprising that both private and public sectors around the world are
investing heavily in this industry. From 1975 to 1983, it is estimated
that $2.5 billion was invested in 100 new U.S. biotechnology firms. 1'7
With research and development in biotechnology intensifying almost
daily, it is anticipated that this growth trend will continue for decades
to come.
Table 1: Expected Industrial Applications of Biotechnology in Canada*
Agriculture
nitrogen fixation
plant growth and drought
food additives
pesticides
Forestry Pulp and Paper
cellulose conversion to alcohol
enzymes
super-bugs for leaching materials
Biological Animal and Health Products
insulin
human growth hormone
interferon
Energy and Petrochemicals
biomass conversion
plastics
rubber processing materials
biopolymers in tertiary oil recovery
* Source: W.A. Cochrane, "Biotechnology: New Industrial Opportunities for Canada"
in Institute for Research on Public Policy & Science Council of Canada,
Biotechnology in Canada (1980) at 18.
The biotechnology industry in Canada, however, is still at the em-
bryonic stage and is generally considered to be several years behind
that in the United States.18 In Canada, research and development is
being conducted by only a handful of companies and research institu-
tions, and much of it is funded by the federal government. Yet, it is
18 N. Henderson, "Bioproducts Confound the Regulators: Who Should Monitor the 'New
Substances'?" Washington Post (19 August 1984) G1.
17 Krimsky, supra note 7 at 8-9; Cochrane, supra note 10 at 14-17.
18 Cochrane. ibid. at 17.
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very likely that Canada will be in a position to use or adapt techniques
developed in other countries in the areas of health, agriculture, mining,
forestry, energy and pollution control. (Table 1 summarizes the most
expected industrial applications of biotechnology in Canada.)
The Canadian federal government has given priority to biotechnol-
ogy research and industrial development through a National Biotech-
nology Strategy, which identifies four areas of interest: plant strain de-
velopment and nitrogen fixation; cellulose utilization and waste
treatment; mineral leaching; and human and animal health care prod-
ucts. In order to implement the strategy, research efforts have been
enlarged. A Biotechnology Research Institute has been established in
Montreal and the existing Plant Biotechnology Institute in Saskatoon
has been expanded. In addition, the National Research Council, Agri-
culture Canada, Environment Canada and other federal departments
and agencies are directly involved in research and support university
and industrial activities.19
Hence, as with the U.S. and other parts of the world, Canada is
forging ahead in ensuring the development of its biotechnology indus-
try. Clearly substantial benefits are possible, including the alleviation of
some of the world's most intractable environmental problems such as
widespread hunger and chemical pollution. However, although biotech-
nology has the potential to bring with it tremendous benefits, it also has
the potential for as yet incalculable and uncertain risks to human
health and the ecology.
C. Industrial Applications of Biotechnology - The Risks
Consideration of the risks associated with the applications of bio-
technology is helped by looking more closely at how they would take
place, which generally speaking are either contained or open environ-
ment applications. On the one hand, there are contained applications
where biotechnological techniques are employed within a factory or
laboratory in the production of end products, such as in the manufac-
ture of commercial drugs like insulin. The risk of accidental release to
the environment is similar to that of a leak from a chemical plant. On
the other hand, open environment applications involve new life forms
being directly released into an ecosystem. Examples include the release
of crops resistant to disease and pests or able to survive in extreme cold
or low-nutrient conditions; the use of microorganisms as pesticides or as
agents to prohibit frost formation or to promote nitrogen-fixation; the
10 Albagli, supra note 4 at 12-20.
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application of new life forms to leach out valuable minerals or render
spills of chemicals such as oil or PCBs less toxic.
A decade ago, most of the concerns related to contained applica-
tions, since at the time the field was oriented toward research and ex-
perimentation. The fear was that recombinant DNA research might
create lethal new organisms which could escape from the laboratory
and create uncontrollable human and ecological harm. Such concerns
prompted a voluntary moratorium on research by scientists,20 followed
by the establishment of guidelines for research pertaining to genetic
engineering by the U.S. National Institutes of Health 2 and the Cana-
dian Medical Research Council.22 However, it is now thought that lab-
oratory work poses minimal and acceptable risks but new concerns are
rising about the consequences of deliberately releasing engineered orga-
nisms into the environment. (Table 2 provides an overview of the vari-
ous types of biohazards.)
Table 2: Hazard Type Inventory: Biological Sources*
1. Microorganisms
A. Transmittable disease introduced into, promoted, or carried by genetically
modified microorganisms that are
a. infectious to humans
b. infectious to plants
c. infectious to animals
B. Toxin reactions resulting from biological agents
C. Allergic reaction
D. Enzyme reactions
E. Resistance to antibiotics
2. Plants, Animals, and Insects
A. Ecological imbalance
B. Carriers of human disease
*Source: S. Krimsky, Regulatory Policies on Biotechnology in Canada (1986) at 16.
Although experts in the field expect that most releases will not
have adverse effects and may even have beneficial effects, 23 it is also
20 See, generally, Krimsky, supra note 2; H.R. Eddy, Regulation of Recombinant DNA Re-
search: A Trinational Study (1983) 'at 13-20.
22 National Institutes of Health Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 24556 (June 1983), revised 41
Fed. Reg. 27093 (17 July 1976). Also see, Perpich, "Formulation of the NIH Guidelines for
Recombinant DNA Research as an Exercise in Due Process" (1979) 73 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc.
219.
22 Medical Research Council, Guidelines for Handling Recombinant DNA Molecules and
Animal Viruses and Cells, Cat. No. MR 21-1/1980 (Dec.) & Cat. No. MR 21-1/1979 (June),
revised Cat. No. MR 21-1/1977 (Feb.) [hereinafter Guidelines].
23 J. Miller, "Harmful Environmental Effects of Biotechnology: Consequences of Deliberate
Release" in CELRF Proceedings, supra note 4 at 4.
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thought that some instances will have detrimental effects. 4 The prob-
lem is that the long-term ecological and health impacts of open envi-
ronment releases have yet to be closely examined. Indeed, a U.S. Con-
gressional Subcommittee investigating the environmental implications
of genetic engineering concluded that "predicting the specific type,
magnitude, or the probability of environmental effects associated with
the deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms will be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, at the present time."25 Prediction
depends on knowing the nature of the organism, the nature of the
ecosystem into which it is released and the interactions between the
organism and the biota within that environment. According to the U.S.
Congressional Subcommittee, there is at present no "historical and sci-
entific data base concerning the behavioural characteristics of geneti-
cally-engineered organisms in the environment and no standard ecologi-
cal methodology for predicting the outcome of exotic introduction
.... -2" The potential risk is most often stated to be of a "low
probability, high consequence risk."27 In other words, while there is
only a small chance that damage could occur, if it did it would be
catastrophic. However, knowing this is of little value in judging the
risks of a particular release.
The unpredicability is illustrated in a 1977 experiment in New
Zealand. Two non-pathogenic microorganisms were combined and ap-
plied to tree seedlings in order to enhance their ability to fix nitrogen
from the air. The resulting new organism, expected to be non-patho-
genic, was in fact pathogenic and killed the seedlings to which it was
applied.28 Other, admittedly more speculative, kinds of consequences
include the following:29
- genetically engineered organisms that have been given new traits
could establish a competitive advantage over naturally occurring spe-
cies because of their resistance to particular diseases or lack of natu-
ral predators;
24 D. Suzuki, "Biotechnology: Implications and Potential Biological Pitfalls" in Biotechnol-
ogy in Canada, supra note 10 at 25.
2I House Committee Report, supra note 3 at 20.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. at 13.
28 See, K.L. Giles & H.C.M. Whitehead, "Reassociation of a Modified Mycorrhiza with the
Host Plant Roots (Pinus Radiata) and the Transfer of Acetylene Reduction Activity" (1977)
Plant & Soil 48 at 143-152.
29 See, Miller, supra note 23 at 8-12; F.L. McChesney & R.G. Adler, "Biotechnology Re-
leased from the Lab: The Environmental Regulatory Framework" (1983) 13 Environmental Law
Reporter 10366 at 10368; Krimsky, supra note 7 at 17-18; House Committee Report, supra note
3 at 13, 15-17; EPA Draft Report, supra note 3 at 120-122.
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- organisms could expand beyond their expected niche or prove
toxic to non-target organisms;
- genetically-engineered organisms might persist after their in-
tended function is fulfilled since they are mobile and capable of mi-
grating in response to food and weather conditions;
- since genetically-engineered organisms are "life forms," they
could reproduce and multiply, mutate and evolve leading, in turn, to
the development of characteristics that expand their initial environ-
mental harm or produce new problems in the future;
- microorganisms used to enhance oil or mineral recovery could be
infectious to humans or be potentially serious human toxins.
The closest analogy to these kinds of consequences is the introduc-
tion of non-engineered "exotic" organisms into new ecosystems. New
strains of plants and animals are routinely introduced into different Ca-
nadian environments without harm resulting. Indeed, most crops in
Canada are not naturally occurring. However, well-known examples of
introductions gone awry include chestnut blight, Dutch elm disease,
gypsymoth, Japanese beetles, starlings and kudzu vine in different parts
of North America, rabbits in Australia and the mongoose in Jamaica.30
Many of the effects were completely unexpected. These species were all
benign in their natural environments, but because of their lack of
predators and selective advantage, caused significant environmental dis-
ruption in their new environments. Because biotechnology creates new
(though similar) life forms, it is expected that the release of geneti-
cally-altered organisms will follow a similar pattern.
The likelihood that adverse effects will result when a new life form
is created depends upon the happening of the following occurrences:31
release into the environment; survival and growth in that environment;
contact with other species; harmful influence on an organism or species;
change or movement so as to become harmful; and acquisition of a
competitive advantage, leading indirectly to harmful consequence. Un-
like use of contained applications which require all these contingencies
to occur and is therefore very unlikely, direct releases by definition ne-
cessitate survival, growth and contact with other organisms. The only
contingency is whether the new life form is capable, directly or indi-
3* R. Brink, R. Kinerson & R. Boethling, Exposure Assessment Concerns for Genetically
Engineered Organisms (1983); F.E. Sharples, Spread of Organisms with Novel Genotypes:
Thoughts from an Ecological Perspective (1982); House Committee Report, supra note 3 at 18-
19.
31 House Committee Report, supra note 3 at 20-24; J.F. Rissler, "Research Needs for Biotic
Environmental Effects of Genetically-Engineered Microorganisms" (1984) 7 Recomb. DNA Tech-
nical Bull. 20 at 22.
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rectly, of causing harm to the organisms with which it comes in
contact.
Despite the uncertainties surrounding the effects of open environ-
ment releases, it is suspected that U.S. industry has quietly been test-
ing man-made organisms in the field for some time.32 Public awareness
of this issue intensified in 1984 when environmentalists, led by Jeremy
Rifkin of the Washington based Foundation on Economic Trends, were
successful before a U.S. federal court in obtaining an injunction to
block field tests of bacteria that would render plants frost resistant.33
However, shortly after the court case, the developers of the bacteria
filed an application with Agriculture Canada to conduct field tests on
the same organism. 34
D. Need for Regulation of Open Environment Releases
Biotechnology is the first new technology to come of age within a
regulatory framework of environmental approvals, emission standards
and environmental impact assessment. This framework has been estab-
lished in large part because of society's experience with new technolo-
gies, in particular organic chemicals and nuclear power. These have
created serious threats to human health and the environment and have
left the public wary of them and the wisdom of leaving decisions about
their use entirely in the hands of engineers and scientists.
Although no comprehensive approach to regulating biotechnology
has yet been adopted, it is unrealistic to expect that industries using
these techniques will remain unregulated. If no action is soon taken
toward establishing a regulatory framework, regulators in various de-
partments and levels of government may step in in individual cases as
the industry develops and the issues arise. This creates the potential for
overlap, duplication of effort and inconsistent decisions. There is also a
substantial risk to the company left to operate in a "regulatory vac-
uum" in terms of the potential financial liability for a release which
turns into an environmental disaster.
At a conference held by the Canadian Environmental Law Re-
search Foundation in 1984, the need for regulation of some sort was
not challenged by any participant. In fact, Alan Bates, President of
2 P. Ohlendorf, "Avoiding a Genetic Catastrophe" 6 August 1984 Maclean's 44 at 45.
13 Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler (1984), 14 E.L.R. 20467 (D.D.C.).
34 Ohlendorf, supra note 32 at 46. Application has been received by the Ontario Ministry of
the Environment to use genetically-engineered microorganisms in the clean up of PCBs in a creek
near London, Ontario. See, P. Rickwood, "Experts Work on PCB-Eating Bug as Scientists Warn
of Genetic Peril", Toronto Star (2 February 1985).
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Allelix Inc., the Ontario biotechnology company funded by Labatt's
Breweries and the Ontario government, opened his remarks as follows:
Allelix, as a significant industrial participant in the field of biotechnology,
strongly believes that biological organisms intended for use in the environment
should be regulated at both research and commercial application stages.,
From an industry as well as an environmental protection perspective, it
makes sense to introduce regulation at the earliest possible stage. If
regulation can be thought out and brought in before there is significant
activity in the industry rather than after a few years of operation and a
major environmental disaster, costs to industry and harm to the envi-
ronment are minimized in the long run.
From a regulatory perspective, the distinction between contained
and open-environment applications presents a convenient approach to
addressing the health and ecological concerns of biotechnology. A regu-
latory regime pertaining to contained applications would be primarily
directed to the issues of research, development and the manufacture of
new life forms, and the problems of workers' health. Due to the infancy
of the biotechnology industry, the only regulatory initiatives to date in
the field have been directed to this realm. More particularly, the re-
search guidelines of the Medical Research Council (MRC) and the
work conducted by the Biohazards Committee of the MRC have made
significant progress in ensuring the development of minimum standards
for human safety and environmental protection in the context of recom-
binant DNA and virus research.3 6 Further, various provincial occupa-
tional health and safety laws, such as the Ontario Occupational Health
and Safety Act,37 are important and progressive initiatives within the
context of contained applications.3 8 Some thought may be given to fur-
ther dividing this category at some time in the future as the industry
evolves. For instance, it may be necessary to differentiate those activi-
ties in the laboratory that involve the research of new life forms from
those activities within a factory setting that apply biotechnological
techniques to the manufacture of a given product.
Unlike contained applications, there has been no regulatory re-
sponse in Canada to the potential release of new life forms into the
open environment. The failure to explicitly address the issue of open-
35 A. Bates, "Comments on CELRF Discussion Paper 'Biotechnology and the Environment:
A Regulatory Proposal'" in CELRF Proceedings, supra note 4 at 1.
3' Guidelines, supra note 22; Eddy, supra note 20 at 68-76.
31 R.S.O. 1980, c. 321.
-" Law Reform Commission of Canada, New Genetic Life Forms (P. Davidson: Study Paper)
(1983) at 108-112.
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environment releases may be due to the infancy of the industry in Can-
ada. However, as the industry develops, environmental releases that im-
pact on ecosystems would be the most immediate and the most difficult
to control.3 9 While primary attention with biotechnology has focused on
techniques such as recombinant DNA and cell fusion which create life
forms not occurring in nature, techniques such as selective breeding
also modify life forms. Thus, whatever technique is used in their crea-
tion, concern should be for the uncontrolled introduction of exotic or
novel life forms into the environment. Although the control of releases
of non-engineered organisms would be more difficult in practice than
the products of an emerging industry, discussion will be limited to reg-
ulating releases of engineered organisms.
III. EVALUATION OF EXISTING LEGISLATION TO CON-
TROL OPEN ENVIRONMENT RELEASES
The extent to which existing regulation applies or can be adapted
to apply to the problem at hand is an important starting point when
considering regulation. Due to the sharing of constitutional powers be-
tween the federal and provincial levels of government over environmen-
tal protection in Canada, it is difficult to fully evaluate the potential of
existing legislation to deal effectively with the hazards of biotechnol-
ogy. There is considerable disparity in the nature, type and sophistica-
tion of legislation pertaining to environmental protection among the
provinces. Hence, where federal legislation is not applicable, there may
be a total regulatory vacuum in one province whereas, in another, ex-
isting controls may take into account, at least to some extent, the con-
cerns under examination. Since it is beyond the scope of this study to
review the regulatory controls in all ten provinces, the Province of On-
tario will be used as the primary focus, recognizing that it may not be
representative of the regulatory situation in other provinces. Further, to
simplify the discussion and create an evaluative framework, present
legislative controls are examined in light of a limited number of issues
which are of particular concern to the regulation of open-environment
releases. These issues are related to the kinds of risks associated with
open-environment releases and the state of knowledge about these risks
in individual cases:40
-1 It should be mentioned, however, that despite the conceptual distinction between contained
and open-environment applications, in reality there would be significant areas of regulatory over-
lap. For example, in both instances, provisions should be made for accidental and inadvertent
escape of new life forms, and their transport, storage and disposal.
40 The first three issues have been identified elsewhere. See, R.J. Herring, "Regulation of
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(a) Are risks to health and environmental impacts assessed before a
genetically-altered organism can be released to the environment?
(b) Is there authority to prevent or control releases when there is a
high risk of harm or when there is uncertainty about the risks
involved?
(c) Is there power to require clean-up of accidental releases?
(d) Are there rules establishing liability for harm resulting from re-
leases to the environment and providing for compensation of
victims?
A. Assessment of Impact and Risks
It has come to be generally accepted in Canada that, prior to the
commencement of environmentally disruptive activities including the
introduction into the environment of potentially harmful substances,
there is need for some assessment of their potential impacts. Because
direct release of new genotypes has the potential to seriously harm the
environment both directly and indirectly, assessment of those impacts is
an important prerequisite to release.
Although both the federal and Ontario governments have formal
mechanisms to assess the environmental impacts of certain activities,
open-environment release of new life forms requires a risk assessment.
Risk assessment differs from environmental impact assessment in that
it considers the mathematical likelihood of a human health hazard oc-
curring from exposure to a harmful substance. At present, there is no
explicit requirement at either the provincial or federal level that risk be
assessed before industrial activities take place.
At the federal level, the Environmental Assessment Review Pro-
cess (EARP), established by Cabinet directive rather than legislation,
applies to the projects, programs and activities of federal departments,
agencies and Crown corporations.41 The EARP can also apply to pro-
grams which are funded by the federal government. The first stage of
the process is a preliminary self-screening where the proponent itself
assesses whether its project will have significant environmental effects.
If so, the project will be subject to a hearing; if not, the project pro-
ceeds; if the effects are unknown, an initial evaluation must be done.
At the provincial level, the Environmental Assessment Act
Biotechnology: Department of Environment Response" in CELRF Proceedings, supra note 4 at 3;
McChesney & Adler, supra note 29 at 10369.
41 Revised Guide to the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process, SOR/84-
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(EAA)42 requires prior assessment of the environmental impacts of and
consideration of alternatives to provincial and municipal government
projects and "undertakings" (including policies and programs) unless
exempted. The EAA can be applied to private undertakings if the gov-
ernment designates them, but very few and only major private under-
takings have been so designated.
It is unlikely that either regime, as presently structured, would
play a large role in the assessment of potential impacts of open-environ-
ment releases, for several reasons.43 With both impact assessment re-
gimes, there are gaps with respect to those undertakings which must be
subject to assessment, as they only apply to government activities.
Moreover, they do not in practice always apply to all activities within
that range (due to self-screening at the federal level and to the use of
exemptions in Ontario). In addition, the kinds of activities of concern
are not likely to fit fully into either scheme. Although the federal gov-
ernment is both conducting and funding research on biotechnology, it is
not likely that there will be much government involvement in industrial
applications. The only kind of "project" which may require EARP is
the field testing of genetically-engineered organisms by a government
department as an outcome of its research program.
Other statutes such as the federal government's Environmental
Contaminants Act," the Pest Control Products Act45 and the Seeds
Act,46 provide more specialized but less formal procedures for the as-
sessment of environmental impacts. Each legislation will be considered
in turn.
1. The Environmental Contaminants Act (ECA)
The ECA, jointly administered by the Departments of National
Health and Welfare and Environment, is designed to control releases
into the environment of those "substances" that may constitute a sig-
nificant danger to human health or the environment. Under the Act,
substances of concern undergo an assessment by the two Departments.
On the basis of their reports, the federal Cabinet has the authority to
prohibit the release, import, manufacture, process or sale of the sub-
42 R.S.O. 1980, c. 140 and R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 293.
41 See, D.P. Emond, Environmental Assessment Law in Canada (1978); M.A. Carswell & J.
Swaigen, ed., Environment on Trial, 2d ed. (1978) at c. 3; R. Cotton & D.P. Emond, "Environ-
mental Impact Assessment" in J. Swaigen, ed., Environmental Rights in Canada (1981) 245.
44 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72.
41 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-10.
46 R.S.C. 1970, c. S-7.
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stance in question, provided that they are "satisfied" that the substance
will constitute a "significant danger . . . to human health or the envi-
ronment . . . . 47 Under the Act, the manufacturer or importer of a
new chemical is required to supply to the government certain informa-
tion, including any information in the possession of the company on the
environmental hazards of the chemical.4 8 When the Ministers "sus-
pect" that a substance is entering or will enter the environment in
quantities or under conditions they believe may constitute a "significant
danger to human health or the environment," they may collect data
about the substance4 9 and may require companies involved with that
substance to furnish additional data or to conduct tests." The Minis-
ters can use this further information to assess the need to regulate the
manufacture or use of the substance. Lists of priority and candidate
chemicals have been developed and are updated periodically as infor-
mation is gathered and the dangers posed by the listed substances
assessed.5 '
At present, the Act would not apply to the regulation of biotech-
nology because of the narrow definition given to "substances". Section
2(1) of the Act defines "substance" as any distinguishable kind of inan-
imate matter. Hence, all new or modified life forms are excluded from
the procedures outlined in the Act. Nevertheless, if the definition of
"substance" was enlarged to include "animate" matter, the ECA has
some potential for requiring assessment of environmental hazards and
for control of open-environment releases as long as they occur "in the
course of any commercial, manufacturing or processing activity. '52
The major limitation on using the ECA for assessing the impacts
of biotechnology is that in order to require detailed information from a
manufacturer or importer, the Ministers must have "reason to believe"
significant harm will occur. Since there is as yet no evidentiary record
on which to base such a finding on genetically-engineered organisms,
the chance of there being sufficient evidence to make that finding prior
to release is limited. In addition, it is only open to the Ministers to
require the furnishing of information about a substance from the man-
ufacturer or importer of the substance, but not the user.53
'7 ECA s. 7.
48 ECA subsection 4(6).
4 ECA subsection 3(3).
1* ECA subsection 4(1).
11 ECA, "Priority and Candidate Chemicals List" revised June 1984.
52 ECA subsection 4(1).
,3 In 1984, the Department of Environment and Health and Welfare proposed major amend-
ments to the ECA which were the subject of public comment in 1985 and were put before a
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2. Pest Control Products Act (PCPA)
Under the PCPA, biological control agents formulated as pesti-
cides are registered for sale and use in Canada. The Act, administered
by the Department of Agriculture, applies to most biological pesticides
including those consisting of microbial agents (bacteria, viruses, fungi
and protozoa) and those of a biochemical nature (such as pheromones,
juvenile growth hormones and natural plant regulators which modify
pest activities or growth processes) including those created using bi-
otechnological methods. The Department assesses the impact of any
new genotypes used as pesticides and can prevent the release of those
deemed environmentally unacceptable. Guidelines are currently being
prepared to define the data required to support the registration of bio-
logical pesticides containing naturally-occurring microbial agents.
Given adequate information, this review could be expanded to include
new genotypes used as pesticides.
Although the PCPA does provide for the prior assessment of im-
pacts and risks of open-environment releases, the Act's registration re-
quirements are burdened with serious deficiencies. A recent report
studying the entire ambit of pesticide law in Canada concluded that
some of these deficiencies include
* * * inadequate testing requirements and practices; dubious assumptions with re-
spect to acceptable risk of such products; and virtual lock-out of the public from
participation in the decision-making process respecting registration or re-evalua-
tion) The registration program also offers the possibility of some pesticides reach-
ing the market and the environment despite lack of adequate health and safety
dat. These authorized departures from full registration requirements threaten
th integrity of the federal government's program, yet adequate safeguards do
not appear to be in place to prevent abuses."
The controls of biological pesticides under PCPA are augmented
by provincial legislation such as the Ontario Pesticides Act 55 (PA).
Under the PA, Ontario controls the use of federally registered products
through a system of permits and licences. This system acts as a control
on the calibre of those persons using pesticides and the conditions of
use. The Act also creates a Pesticides Advisory Committee,56 which has
the responsibility of reviewing the content and operation of the Act
each year and making appropriate recommendations for amendments.
special consultative committee in September 1985. Some of the limitations of the ECA described
herein will be addressed in this review.
" Law Reform Commission of Canada, Pesticides: An Examination of Canadian Law and
Policy (J.F. Castrilli & T. Vigod: Draft Paper) (1984) at 207-208.
' R.S.O. 1980, c. 376.
PA s. 10.
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More specifically, it reviews and classifies all existing pesticides and
undertakes research:
1. to find alternative pesticides for those which are deemed environ-
mentally hazardous;
2. to determine potential environmental hazards of pesticides cur-
rently in use; and
3. to reduce pesticide input into the environment.
These research functions could be applied to new organisms to be used
as pesticides, providing valuable information to be used in review.
Like the federal Act, however, the PA has not been free from criti-
cism. 5 7 Most notably, farmers seem to be exempt from all or most per-
mit and licensing requirements, despite the fact that agriculture is the
predominant area of pesticide use in Canada. Further, enforcement
measures and procedures have not always been applied consistently nor
adequately responded to the problems of pesticide misuse.
3. Seeds Act
Assessment and control of genetically-engineered plants could oc-
cur through the Seeds Act 8 which regulates the designation, sale and
import of seeds. The Act provides for the establishment of minimum
standards of seed purity, germination, quality and disease which all
seeds must meet before they can be sold in Canada. They can, however,
be field tested without review unless they are new seeds imported into
Canada.
There are two major limitations in using the Seeds Act to assess
and control environmental impacts of genetically-engineered seeds. One
is the narrow criteria used to assess the acceptability of seeds. The em-
phasis is on the quality and health of the crop which will be grown
from the seed, not the potential interactions of the plant with the
ecosystem. Another limitation is the fact that no assessment occurs
prior to field testing, which would thus allow an open-environment re-
lease.59 If these limitations could be remedied, the Seeds Act would
have potential for control in this one small part of the open-environ-
ment use of biotechnology.
In summary, it is clear that, for the most part, existing legislative
mechanisms are either inadequate or incomplete to assess the impact
and risks associated with open-environment releases of new life forms.
" Castrilli & Vigod, supra note 54 at 209.
" R.S.C. 1970, c. S-7.
" Krimsky, supra note 7 at 24.
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In short, existing legislation simply was not designed to take into ac-
count some of the basic concerns which are present with many open-
environment releases.
B. Regulatory Powers
The requirement of assessment alone is of little value in ensuring
environmental protection without authority to prevent or control re-
leases where the assessment reveals a high probability of harm or insuf-
ficient information on which to make that judgment. At the federal and
provincial levels, there exist legislation which may provide direct or in-
direct controls on the release of new life forms into the environment.
However, prevention of release is only contemplated where harm can
be proved as either occurring or likely to occur.
Direct controls are found in some of the legislation discussed
above. For example, under the Environmental Contaminants Act, once
a substance or a product has been placed on the schedule, the control
mechanisms are triggered to prohibit or limit its release, manufacture
or sale.60 However, before Cabinet can exercise its powers, it must be
"satisfied" that a "significant danger" is present.8 1 This means that
preventing releases is contingent upon evidence of harm. A further lim-
itation is that the Act is residual in nature, as no regulation is permit-
ted where action is taken or proposed to be taken by provincial govern-
ments pursuant to some other law. 2 Moreover, no person can object or
require a hearing into why a substance has not been proposed for regu-
lation. The Departments of Environment and Health and Welfare and
the Cabinet retain the absolute discretion to initiate review. Thus, ef-
fective prevention and control of hazards is unlikely under the ECA.
The Department of National Health and Welfare Act6 3 and pat-
ent laws provide possible avenues for direct control. Under the former,
the federal Cabinet is empowered to regulate ". . . all matters relating
to the promotion or preservation of the health, social security and social
welfare of the people of Canada over which the Parliament of Canada
has jurisdiction ....*"I4 However, no regulations on genetically-engi-
neered organisms have been passed.6 5
In light of recent court decisions in the United States and deci-
0 ECA s. 8.
61 ECA s. 7.
ECA s. 5.
63 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-9.
" Health and Welfare Act s. 5.
15 Davidson, supra note 38 at 116.
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sions of patent authorities in Canada that new life forms are patenta-
ble,"6 control could be exercised by making safety and release require-
ments a condition for obtaining patent protection. However, the
relevant governmental authorities possess neither the resources nor the
expertise to initiate standards or to enforce the protections of criteria.
Moreover, if the requirements were seen as too onerous, developers
might simply avoid the patent process altogether. Finally, there is some
doubt whether the federal government would be constitutionally justi-
fied in employing patent law in this fashion.6 7
Another form of direct control is found in provincial environmen-
tal legislation, such as the Environmental Protection Act (EPA).68 The
Ontario Ministry of the Environment (MOE) can issue "control or-
ders" or "stop orders" for the release of "contaminants" that are in
contravention of the Act or that pose an immediate danger to people or
property. 9 In addition, the MOE can require those releasing the con-
taminant to have on hand equipment and materials necessary to allevi-
ate the effect of any contaminant on the natural environment.70
The major tool under the EPA for controlling new pollution
sources is the "certificate of approval," which is required before any
person can:
(a) "construct, alter, extend or replace any plant, structure, equip-
ment, apparatus, mechanism or thing that may emit or discharge
a contaminant into any part of the natural environment
or
(b) "alter a process or rate of production with the result that a con-
taminant may be emitted .... ,,71
Specifications and conditions of operation can be required before a cer-
tificate is issued. Unfortunately, while a certificate might be necessary
for some contained applications, it does not seem to be necessary prior
to direct releases to the environment.
The applicability of all these controls in the EPA is uncertain,
however, because it is not clear whether a new genotype would fall
within its definition of a "contaminant" - "any solid, liquid, gas,
odour, heat, sound, vibration, radiation or combination of any of them
"o In the U.S., see, Diamond v. Chakrabarly 447 U.S. 330 (1980). In Canada, see, Decision
of the Commissioner of Patents, Patent Application 257177 (18 March 1982).
'" See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 38 at 55-58.
'" R.S.O. 1980, c. 141.
19 EPA ss. 6, 7, 11.
70 EPA s. 17.
71 EPA s. 8.
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resulting directly or indirectly from the activities of man' ' 1 - which
may adversely affect health or the environment. This does not appear
to apply to living organisms given the ordinary meaning of the words.
Moreover, even if these uncertainties were resolved and the Act made
to apply, it could at most control known environmental hazards. Be-
cause of the uncertainty surrounding the hazards of new life forms, a
mechanism for preventing release until more information is available is
needed.
Aside from the direct control mechanisms, general environmental
protection statutes creating offences for causing harm to the environ-
ment provide indirect regulatory control. For instance, the federal Fish-
eries Act makes it an offence to deposit a "deleterious substance" of
any type into waters frequented by fish.7 3 Under the EPA, it is unlaw-
ful to release a "contaminant" into the environment that causes or is
likely to cause impairment to the environment, injury to property, plant
or animal life, or that adversely affects human health or safety.7 4 In
addition to environmental protection legislation, other indirect controls
include various provisions of the Criminal Code such as common nui-
sance,75 criminal negligence76 and mischief.77 Other statutes which may
have some limited application to the control of biotechnology include
the Hazardous Products Act7 18 and the Transportation of Dangerous
Goods Act.79 Although indirect controls provide a general deterrent by
imposing criminal or financial liability, the drawback is that they are
only triggered after the damage or harm has arisen.
C. Accidental Releases
Accidental and inadvertent releases of new life forms include spills
from otherwise "contained" applications and from deliberate releases
gone awry. The concern is that unknown or unexpected injury to the
environment could occur before the organisms could be contained and
72 EPA subsection 1(c).
73 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, s. 33.
74 R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, s. 13.
75 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 176.
76 Code ss. 202-204.
77 Code s. 387.
78 R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3. The HPA controls the advertising, sale and importation of "hazard-
ous products". This Act has marginal relevance for environmental applications of biotechnology
because of the narrow definition of hazardous product and because there is no mention of re-
search, manufacturing or use of the product.
79 S.C. 1980, c. 36. This Act may apply to the interprovincial transport of bioengineered
products.
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cleaned up (assuming certain life forms can be contained and neutral-
ized).80 Unfortunately, regulatory methods to deal with environmental
emergencies are not well developed in Canada. Indeed, at present,
there are only a few avenues available to provide authority for such
measures.
First, the ECA vests the Cabinet with certain emergency powers
when it is "satisfied" that "immediate action" is required to prevent a
"significant danger" to human health or the environment. It can pro-
hibit the release of a substance without the necessity of provincial con-
sultation or fulfilling other procedural formalities.81 As noted above,82
however, the present definition of "substance" is limited to "inanimate
matter," and thus excludes all new or modified life forms and
substances.
Second, the EPA authorizes the issuance of control and stop or-
ders to require discontinuance of the release of contaminants in contra-
vention of the Act or which constitute an immediate danger to human
health and property."8 However, the only authority provided to require
clean-up of the ensuing release is a section 16 order to repair.
Finally, a number of contingency plans exist which provide co-or-
dinated responses to spills of hazardous material.84 The Centre for Spill
Technology is responsible for the technological development of counter-
measures, but such mechanisms are primarily directed toward oil and
chemical spills. The adaptability and suitability of these plans with re-
spect to new life forms is a question in need of further research. Fur-
ther, even if aspects of these measures could be made applicable, there
would still be significant areas of concern where various open-environ-
ment releases would not have the benefit of these emergency
procedures.
80 Some concern has been expressed that, once released, genetically-engineered organisms
will be impossible to contain. See, e.g., comments by Dr. Jacques Berger in Ohlendorf, supra note
32 at 45.
81 ECA subsections 7(3)-7(5).
82 Supra, text at note 52.
" EPA ss. 6, 7.
See, e.g., Joint U.S.-Canadian Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan
for the Great Lakes Region, Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (1972) at Annex 8; Federal
Department of the Environment (Ontario Region), Contingency Plan for Oil Spills and Other
Hazardous Materials. For a discussion of the various contingency plans, see, International Joint
Commission, International Reference Group on Great Lakes Pollution from Land Use Activities,
An Evaluation of Canadian Legislative, Regulatory and Administrative Programs (1977) at 240-
241.
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D. Liability and Compensation
Liability and compensation in environmental cases are dealt with
under tort law. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the ade-
quacy and suitability of tort law to environmental wrongs. Neverthe-
less, it is important to recognize that traditional common law doctrines
are ill-suited to deal with many of the issues inherent in an environ-
mental lawsuit.8 To generalize, in order to be compensated for harm, a
plaintiff must establish that the particular requirements of the tort are
fulfilled. The plaintiff also has the onus of establishing the causal nexus
between the activities of the defendant and the harm for which com-
pensation is being sought. There also exist more general obstacles to
recovery including the lack of standing to enforce "public" rights, limi-
tation periods which do not account for latent effects, limitations on the
kinds of harm which can be compensated and the high cost and delay
involved in litigation.
In cases involving open-environment release of new life forms, per-
haps the most difficult obstacle facing an aggrieved party would be that
of causation - the task of establishing the causative link between the
victim's injury and the defendant's conduct.86 Even in the simplest of
environmental cases, sophisticated monitoring devices are often unable
to accurately correlate the release of a contaminant in one area or at
one time with the adverse impact in another place or time. For new life
forms released into the environment, it may be decades after the re-
lease before any impact on the ecosystem and humans is detected or
fully understood. Moreover, the release of genetically-engineered orga-
nisms may start a chain reaction of disturbances or consequences. It
may therefore be impossible to delineate which consequences are the
result of natural factors and which are caused by the releases.
Many of the potential consequences of releases of genetically-engi-
neered organisms will involve ecological disruption, including the loss
of species diversity. Because the common law generally protects private
rights, it is unlikely that an individual or group could have standing in
a court to seek a remedy for such consequences.87 Even a public nui-
sance action pursued by the Attorney General is a hollow safeguard
given the long-term environmental consequences.
85 P.S. Elder, "Environmental Protection Through the Common Law" (1973) 12 U. of W.
Ont. L. Rev. 107; Carswell & Swaigen, supra note 43 at c. 18.
Be J.P.S. McLaren, "The Law of Torts and Pollution" in Law Society of Upper Canada
Special Lectures (1973) 309 at 325-328. For an interesting discussion of the use of technology in
proof of causation, see, H. Latin, G. Tannehill & R. White, "Remote Sensing Evidence and Envi-
ronmental Law" (1976) 64 CaL L. Rev. 1300.
87 W. Estey, "Public Nuisance and Standing to Sue" (1972) 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 563.
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In the event that a plaintiff could establish standing, prove causa-
tion and counter all defences, there would still remain the problem of
assessing damages. The recognition that traditional common law reme-
dies have not kept pace with the current understanding of ecological
realities has led some jurisdictions to enact legislation to relieve some
of the difficulties, such as the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act,88 which establishes a "super-
fund" to pay for the clean up of abandoned toxic waste sites.
In Canada, there have been several statutory attempts to remedy
some of the inequities of the common law in the areas of liability and
compensation. There is no broad provision applicable to all kinds of
environmental harm; rather, all provisions apply in limited circum-
stances. The Nuclear Liability Act 89 provides for absolute liability on
the part of the operator of a nuclear facility for harm caused by nu-
clear materials and requires such operators to carry insurance. How-
ever, compensation must still be sought through the judicial system.
The Pesticide Residue Compensation Act (PCPA)90 is of more direct
relevance to the issue of harm caused by genetically-engineered orga-
nisms. Under this Act, farmers can apply to the government for com-
pensation when their crop is so contaminated due to a pesticide regis-
tered under the PCPA that its sale would be contrary to the Food and
Drugs Act."' Compensation is limited to a percentage of the crop lost,
not for injuries to health or environmental disruption and all legal rem-
edies must first be exhausted, making this scheme of little practical
value to victims of serious harm caused by open-environment releases.
Other provisions include Part XX of the Canada Shipping Act, 92
which establishes a Maritime Pollution Claims Fund for damage
caused by oil pollution; the Fisheries Act,9 3 which provides for absolute
liability and compensation to commercial fishermen for loss of income
due to the deposit of a deleterious substance into water frequented by
fish; the Ontario Waste Well Disposal Fund established under the En-
vironmental Protection Act,94 which sets up a fund to compensate per-
sons whose water is damaged due to operation of waste wells; and Part
IX of the EPA, the "Spills Bill," which covers questions of liability and
88 42 U.S.C. ss. 9601-9657.
89 R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 29.
90 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-I1.
:1 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27.
92 R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9.
93 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14.
" EPA s. 46.
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compensation for harm caused by spills of pollutants.95 It is not clear
that any of these statutes would apply in a case of harm to health or
environmental disruption caused by release of genetically-engineered
organisms, although some could be amended to apply in their limited
circumstances. Thus, any attempt at obtaining compensation for such
damage would fall back on the provisions of the common law.
IV. TOWARD A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Overview
An evaluation of the current regulatory framework indicates that
open-environment releases will occur largely in a regulatory vacuum. In
some instances, it may be possible to extend present legislative initia-
tives, and where regulatory gaps still persist, new legislation may be
necessary. However, the inherent complexities and potential importance
of the biotechnology industry suggest that this sort of piecemeal ap-
proach to regulation will provide neither acceptable and efficacious reg-
ulation which protects the interests of the public and the environment
nor a setting conducive to efficient and productive industrial
achievements.
The balance between the protection of the public interest in a
healthy environment and the goal of economic and industrial prosperity
is sometimes a tenuous one. On the one hand, the benefits of biotech-
nology may have a positive impact in every sector of society, including
the potential of addressing many of the world's most troublesome
problems. On the other hand, this generation has the responsibility of
ensuring that future generations will have the benefit of a healthy and
prosperous environment and a sustainable ecological balance. Both of
these goals may be achieved by providing a set of ground rules which
are explicit and effective without being either unfair or too onerous.
This difficult task must commence in advance of full-scale Cana-
dian industrial application of biotechnology in order to permit industry
to take into account such requirements throughout its corporate plan-
ning processes and to ensure long-term environmental viability. Thus,
the creation of a workable regulatory framework in the very near fu-
ture would seem to make both good environmental and good corporate
sense.
In light of the limitations of the existing framework to deal with
low probability high consequence risks, a new regulatory framework is
95 The Ontario Minister of the Environment announced in July 1985 that Part IX would
come into force on 29 November 1985.
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proposed below. Although it is only a starting point for discussion and
is only one of a number of schemes which could be devised, it sets out
the principles which should govern any regulatory approach to this
technology and leaves details to be filled in at a later time.
It is suggested that the new regulatory framework result from a
cooperative effort by the federal and provincial governments. At the
federal level, legislation would be enacted to provide for three avenues
of protection. First, an interdisciplinary commission would be estab-
lished for the purpose of assessing the risks and impacts of all new life
forms intended to be released into the open environment. This national
commission, in effect, would develop and implement a certification pro-
cess (similar to the pesticides registration process under the PCPA)
which would include:
(a) a technical review of the product proposed to be released;
(b) a procedure to ensure for public input;
(c) regularized approval criteria and decision options.
This certification process would apply to all new or modified life forms
intended for open-environment applications before they could be of-
fered for use, sale or distribution. In addition, the national commission
would develop a nation-wide information bank for the purpose of col-
lecting and correlating studies and information on the use, effects, risks
and impacts of new life forms.
The second avenue would deal with accidental or inadvertent re-
leases. Drawing from the knowledge, experience and expertise of the
national commission, formalized emergency response procedures and
strategies would be developed at the national level to prepare for those
situations when new life forms are accidentally released, react in an
unpredictable or unstable manner upon release, or are simply released
in excessive quantities.
Finally, the federal government would oversee the establishment
and administration of a compensation fund for persons suffering harm
from the release of new life forms. The fund's purpose would be to
supplement traditional tort law since it may be very difficult to estab-
lish tort liability against the culpable party.
The provincial role would primarily involve implemention of com-
mission decisions under a permit or licence system for the safe use of
those products certified by the national commission. Hence, the prov-
inces would be responsible for establishing:
(a) criteria as to the qualifications, training and experience of persons
eligible for permits;
(b) in special cases, conditions for use of the products released into
the environment (in addition to those conditions mandated
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through the certification process) including mandatory reporting
requirements;
(c) the availability of equipment, apparatus or other means to ensure
the effectiveness of the emergency response procedures; and
(d) a system for enforcing the conditions of release.
The nature and content of the proposed regulatory framework will
now be examined further. The potential federal role is discussed first,
followed by a review of suggested provincial responsibilities. Subse-
quently, there is a brief discussion of the constitutional implications of
the framework.
B. The Federal Role
Because of the nature of the risks involved with industrial applica-
tions and open-environment releases in particular, there should be a
strong federal role in any regulatory framework. There are several jus-
tifications for this view. First, assessment and regulation of the highly
complex and technical issues involved in open-environment releases re-
quires specialists who, because of their limited numbers in Canada, can
be more easily pooled in one body rather than in each province. Sec-
ond, uniformity of regulatory control throughout Canada is essential
not only to prevent individual provinces from luring industries with in-
adequate standards, but also to deal with problems which are likely to
be interjurisdictional in nature. Third, uniformity of treatment of open
releases is most fair to industry. Finally, the present uncertainty sur-
rounding impacts requires a focal point for compiling data from studies
and experience with open environment releases world-wide rather than
having eleven jurisdictions repeat the task. The resources necessary to
undertake such initiatives would be beyond the capability of most pro-
vincial governments acting on their own.
1. Establishment of a national biotechnology commission
a) Nature and purpose
As the focus for federal regulation of biotechnology, it is proposed
that an independent and interdisciplinary commission (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the National Biotechnology Commission or NBC) be es-
tablished. 98 The NBC would take over the authority now exercised by
several government departments. This step is necessary in order to
achieve a uniform approach to open-environment releases. Moreover,
" In order to clearly establish its authority and precedence over existing bodies, the commis-
sion should be placed in legislation rather than in Cabinet directive or policy.
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the priorities and interests of one department should not be allowed to
detract from the regulatory priority of environmental and health pro-
tection. The NBC's primary purpose would be to provide a means to
study, assess and regulate all new life forms intended to be released
into the open environment, to gather information and data, and to ad-
dress issues of liability and compensation. The primary means of regu-
lating releases of new life forms would be by requiring their "certifica-
tion" as environmentally acceptable based upon an assessment of the
risks posed by the release and a decision as to the acceptability of that
risk.
b) Composition and organization
The NBC would consist of a small administrative "core" responsi-
ble for making all decisions about environmental releases. Because of
the array of issues raised by open-environment releases, particularly
those involving the balancing of risks and benefits, representatives
would be selected from different government departments, disciplines
other than technical ones, the provinces and the general public. Beyond
the administrative core, there would be a "roster" of experts to serve on
the technical review {risk assessment) panels. These panels would in-
clude both staff and those who are asked to participate from govern-
ment, industries and universities on an ad hoc basis. Upon submission
of a new life form for certification, the Commissioners would select a
number of experts from its roster to conduct an investigation and to
make recommendations. The Commissioners would then make their de-
cision as to certification.
c) National information bank
One of the most important requirements of an effective system for
regulating biotechnology is adequate information. The NBC would be
involved in the development of a national information bank, which
would gather and compile information on new life forms and their im-
pact on the ecology and humans. With a national mandate, this infor-
mation bank would serve as a central registry for data from studies
conducted around the world as well as in Canada. As a consequence,
the NBC would have at its disposal the most current and complete
sources of information available for making its certification decisions.
Further, the data base would be a valuable tool for the public in under-
standing the nature of new life forms together with their effects, im-
pacts and characteristics upon release.
[VOL. 23 NO. 2
Biotechnology and Environment
2. Assessment and regulation: the certification process
Certification that the proposed release of a new life form into the
environment is acceptable and thus may be undertaken by those au-
thorized to do so would be required prior to any release. The procedure
would include:
1. a proposal supported by documentation of anticipated environmen-
tal impacts;
2. a technical review of the proposal;
3. the public should have an opportunity to comment on the proposal;
4. the approval decision should be based upon regularized criteria;
5. there should be a range of decision options (such as "approved with
conditions," "require more information" or "reject") which the
commission can make; and
6. the impacts of the releases must be monitored.
a) Documentation
The proponent of each new release would provide sufficient docu-
mentation to enable risk assessment and a certification decision to be
made. What is sufficient would vary with the nature of the particular
release and as experience with environmental releases grows. Nonethe-
less, it would include information from the proponent's tests and studies
as to the nature and basic characteristics of the new life form, the na-
ture of the environments in which the release will be made, and infor-
mation on the demonstrable impacts of release to that environment. In
most cases, this documentation would not pose a disclosure problem
because new life forms or genotypes are patentable. In those cases
where trade secrecy is an issue,97 special rules of confidentiality would
have to be established, which would balance the interests of the propo-
nent in not revealing information about the development of its new
product and the interests of the public in knowing the nature and im-
pact of the proposed release.
b) Technical review
After the documentation is assembled, the risks associated with an
open-environment release would be assessed. This would involve evalua-
tion of the lab research and field studies which address the nature and
behaviour of the organism and interactions with the ecosystem at issue.
1 E.g., problems may arise if certification is applied before the new life form is patented or
the developer of the new life form wishes to keep the product a secret in order to ensure that the
product remains out of the hands of the competitors.
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Because this assessment will be used as the basis for the certification
decision, it is imperative that it be done by as qualified and indepen-
dent a group as possible. It is for this reason that ad hoc technical
panels should be employed. From a roster of qualified experts, the
NBC would select those experts most suitable for the assessment of
risks and impacts of the particular life form and release application
under question. This technical panel would review, study and ulti-
mately report to the NBC. Upon submission of its report, the NBC
may accept the report or send it back to the technical committee for
further review and comment.
c) Public comment
Because the public would be both the ultimate beneficiaries and
the ultimate victims of environmental releases of new life forms, they
should have an opportunity to comment on release proposals. A period
for written comments would be sufficient in most cases, but it may be
appropriate to provide for a mechanism to allow or trigger a public
hearing where the seriousness of the potential impact of the release is
considerable.
A public comment period should be limited in time but sufficient
to allow people to make a meaningful contribution. Features of a public
comment mechanism would include: notice of the proposed certifica-
tion; the availability of technical information on the new life form
(such as the report of the risk assessment panel); access to information
on which the decision will be based, and funding if necessary to allow
members of the public to hire experts to review the technical informa-
tion. Public participation is also provided for in the decision on whether
to certify because of public representation on the NBC itself.
d) Regularized criteria
The certification decision would be made by the NBC relying on
all available information. In order to facilitate uniform treatment of
proposals (and thus fairness to proponents), a standard set of factors or
criteria would be developed, and set out either in legislation or in
guidelines developed by the NBC. Regularized criteria are important in
minimizing the discretion of the decision-maker and in providing a
standard against which to measure the decision and thus a potential
basis for judicial review.
The criteria would include factors which specify how much cer-
tainty is required to approve a release and what to do when uncertainty
exists, what kinds of risks are unacceptable, and what policy objectives
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the decision should strive to accomplish. The increasing popularity of
quantitative risk assessment, where the probability of a certain effect
(usually cancer) in a given population is estimated, as a basis of deci-
sion-making is inappropriate for regulating biotechnology. The com-
plexity and unpredictability of the potential interactions and the limita-
tions in this approach to risk assessment as well as the unacceptability
of agreeing to a given amount of harm rather than seeking to keep
harm to a minimum lead to the conclusion that this is not a suitable
tool for an effective decision.
e) Decision options
In order to have the flexibility to deal with a variety of situations
and be an effective force in controlling the harmful effects of environ-
mental releases, the NBC must have more authority than simply the
power to accept or reject a proposal for certification. Before certifica-
tion is granted, the NBC would be empowered to remit the proposal for
further review by the risk assessment panel or simply defer the propo-
sal until more is known about the new life form and its potential inter-
actions in its intended environment. Further, NBC could set conditions
on the use and release on the new life form once the certification is
granted. For example, the certification could be conditional upon the
product only being released in certain defined environments, at certain
times, for a certain period of time, or in certain concentrations or quan-
tities. When a release will occur in numerous unrelated environments
and the NBC cannot satisfy itself that certification will be suitable in
all those areas, it should be open to the commission to leave the condi-
tions of release up to the provinces.
Most would agree that a new life form should not be certified for
release forever, because experience is continually being gained and new
information developed. Reassessment could be triggered by the NBC or
others, including members of the public. Since a proponent could suffer
considerable financial hardship if the reassessment were adverse, all in-
terested persons involved would have the right of appeal. There are va-
rious ways that appeals could be built into the system, such as judicial
review or the creation of an administrative review board.
3. Accidental releases
An effective regulatory system may minimize but it cannot elimi-
nate the chance of an accident occurring during research, manufacture
or use of a product. (For open-environment releases, an "accident"
would include release in the wrong amount or place.) In many cases,
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the accidental release may be easily contained and removed safely or
may not create a hazard.
However, because living organisms are involved, containment may
be difficult or impossible and, consequently, there should be a formal-
ized method and procedure to provide for the reporting, containment
and clean up of accidental releases. To accomplish this task, it is pro-
posed that the NBC be given the authority to develop effective response
strategies - procedures to ensure proper coordination of personnel and
equipment, and proper methods of removal and disposal of released
products. The actual implementation of the procedures would be left to
provincial agencies.
4. Liability and compensation
Because of the limited usefulness of the common law actions in
compensating victims of environmental releases, a compensation fund
could be established to which victims could make claims as soon as
damage becomes apparent and which would thus by-pass the question
of tort liability. Contributions would be made on a regular basis by
those firms or groups which release new life forms into the environ-
ment, according to a predetermined formula based on variables such as
the type of release, the degree of risk involved in each, and the magni-
tude of harm associated with the type of release.
Claims against the fund would be allowed in three circumstances:
(1) when funding is necessary in order to allow public participation in a
certification procedure; (2) when health or property is harmed as a di-
rect or indirect result of an environmental release; and (3) for the cost
of remedial action to control or clean up the damage by an environ-
mental release.
The NBC should be vested with the responsibility of administering
the fund and undertaking an investigation when a claim is filed. The
onerous common law requirement of causation could be mitigated by a
rebuttable presumption of causation upon the proving of certain facts.
Since damages should allow for full compensation, after the payment of
the award, the NBC could then take traditional legal recourses to re-
cover damages and consequent costs from the party who released the
product.
C. The Provincial Role
The provinces would have the responsibility to ensure the proper
and safe use of life forms certified by the federal government. This
would be fulfilled through (1) the development of a permit system and
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(2) the establishment of mechanisms to provide for close federal-pro-
vincial liaison and enforcement, by either adopting or amending ex-
isting legislation.
First, the primary provincial role in controlling direct releases is to
establish a system for licensing persons conducting releases. Although
licensing would primarily be designed to ensure competence of the op-
erator, it may also include: reporting requirements to ensure compli-
ance with federal and provincial conditions of release; requirements
that certain equipment be available to ensure safe release and prompt
response in case of emergency; and rules regarding conditions of release
stricter than those allowed under federal certification, safe transporta-
tion and disposal. In many instances the licensing function would be
administered by an existing provincial department.
In addition, each province would ensure that the applicant is com-
petent by developing a set of criteria outlining minimum qualifications,
training and experience. Other requirements could include specifica-
tions of equipment to be used and the provision of information on re-
leases to the NBC as a check on compliance and for the information
bank.
Further, although the NBC would establish conditions of release
for particular genotypes, the provinces should be able to strengthen
those conditions when local circumstances warrant; for example, when
a particular area is ecologically more vulnerable to harm or the needs
of a particular community demand it. It is contemplated that this
would occur only when federal certification was made conditional on
local certification.
Secondly, since no regulatory framework can work effectively un-
less there is close federal-provincial consultation and co-operation at
almost every stage of the regulatory process, there would be need to co-
ordinate scientific and technical information and other administrative
resources between the two levels of government. Consequently, there is
a need to develop networks and channels for open and efficient dialogue
and communications. One way of achieving this is through provincial
government participation on the NBC.
D. The Constitutional Implications
According to the Constitution98 and the judicial interpretations of
its provisions, each level of government is assigned specific areas within
which it is exclusively competent to legislate in its own right. Conse-
11 Constitution Act, 1876 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3.
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quently, it is important to ensure that the proposed regulatory frame-
work is feasible in approach in the sense that each level of government
is constitutionally empowered to act in accordance with the design of
the proposed scheme.
However, it is not the intent of this article to discuss all of the
constitutional implications of the proposed framework, but to simply
discuss how the role of each level of government under the proposed
framework would be constitutionally justified and supportable.
Generally, it would seem that the provincial governments have pri-
mary constitutional authority over regulation of the biotechnology in-
dustry under the powers over "property and civil rights,"99 "local works
and undertakings,"100 and "matters of a merely local or private na-
ture." 10' Such powers provide ample support for the proposition that
the regulation of business is a matter of provincial competence.' 0 2 In
addition, it is generally accepted that the provincial rights of ownership
of public lands and natural resources and the authority over the "ex-
ploitation, development, conservation and management of non-renewa-
ble natural resources, forestry resources, and electric energy produc-
tion"103 give the provinces the primary role for environmental
management and protection. T
The provincial legislatures, however, cannot enact laws on matters
exclusively assigned to the federal Parliament in section 91 of the Con-
stitution Act, 1867. The federal government has relied on its jurisdic-
tion over regulation of inter-provincial trade and commerce,105 sea
coast and inland fisheries, 0 6 and the criminal law'07 to enact legislation
dealing with environmental protection. Indeed, it has been held that the
"criminal law" embraces laws relating to "public peace, order, security,
health and morality." 0 8 More commonly, however, Parliament has re-
lied on its residual power found in section 91 of the Constitution Act,
9 Constitution Act subsection 92(13).
*1 Constitution Act subsection 92(10).
101 Constitution Act subsection 92(16).
102 P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1977) at 302-303.
101 Constitution Act s. 92A.
104 R.T. Franson & A.R. Lucas, Canadian Environmental Law, vol. 1 (1976) at 253-255.
101 Constitution Act subsection 91(2). E.g., see, Motor Vehicle Safety Act, R.S.C. 1970 (Ist
Supp.), c. 26 and Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations (emission standards).
104 Constitution Act subsection 91(12). E.g., see, Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14.
10, Constitution Act subsection 91(27). See, Code and Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, [1933]
4 D.L.R. 501 (B.C.C.A.).
108 Reference Re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (The Margarine Refer-
ence), [1949] S.C.R. 1.
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1867 as a constitutional basis for its federal environmental statutes. 10 9
This power has had an unwieldy history with judicial interpretation os-
cillating from extremely restrictive to extremely expansive." 0 However,
it seems that the courts now accept reliance on this power in three
circumstances:"' where a national emergency exists; where a problem
arises which did not exist in 1867 and which is not local or private in
nature; and where a matter is by its nature of concern to the whole
country and cannot be solved by co-operative provincial action. It is
submitted that open-environment releases of new life forms fall within
both the second and third circumstances, so as to justify not only fed-
eral involvement, but also the establishment of the NBC, its certifica-
tion process, the development of emergency responses and the compen-
sation fund.
It is clear that, to support the level of involvement by Parliament
under the proposed scheme, the use of the federal residual power would
only modestly modify the existing division of legislative powers between
the federal and provincial governments. Indeed, the proposed frame-
work would not require the federal government to use the residual
power to occupy the total field as it did in the areas of broadcasting, air
transport, atomic energy and the national capital area." 2 Instead, the
extent of involvement would be much more analogous to that jurisdic-
tion exercised by the federal government under the Environmental
Contaminants Act, the Pest Control Products Act and the Pesticide
Residue Compensation Act.
V. SUMMARY
Industrial applications of biotechnology may bring important ben-
efits to Canadian society. They may also pose significant risks to the
Canadian environment and public health. These coming events raise
complex regulatory issues, which must be addressed in advance of full-
scale applications to ensure the long-term viability of the environment
and to allow the industry knowledge of the rules of the game in
119 E.g., Clean Air Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 47 and Canada Water Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st
Supp.), c. 5. See, R. v. Canada Metal Co. Ltd. (1982), 12 C.E.L.R. I (Man. Q.B.), aff'ing
(1982), 11 C.E.L.R. 1 (Man. Prov. Ct.), where emission standards under the Clean Air Act were
upheld under the federal general power.
110 Hogg, supra note 102 at 241-65.
m" Labatt's Breweries v. Attorney General of Canada, et al. (1979), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 594 at
627 (S.C.C.).
112 Broadcasting: Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication, [1932] A.C. 304.
Aeronautics: Johannesson v. West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292. Atomic energy: Pronto Ura-
nium Mines Ltd. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board (1956), 5 D.L.R. (2d) 342. National capital:
Munro v. National Capital Comm'n, [1966] S.C.R. 663.
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advance.
The regulatory framework put forth in this article is intended to
prompt discussion of the principles which should be in the ultimately
chosen framework. For environmental releases, it is important that
there be a single focus for information gathering, assessment of impacts
and regulation. In the Canadian context, this single focus falls logically
at the federal level, with input from the provinces and the public. Reg-
ulation should provide for the mandatory assessment of risks and im-
pacts, the ability to control releases based upon that assessment, plan-
ning for emergencies, and changes in the common law to allow for
compensation for harm resulting from releases. Only with these princi-
ples in mind can the industry be promoted and the risks controlled in
the future.
